It is often assumed (for analytical convenience, but also in accordance with common intuition) that consumer preferences are convex. In this paper, we consider circumstances under which such preferences are (or are not) optimal. In particular, we investigate a setting in which goods possess some hidden quality with known distribution, and the consumer chooses a bundle of goods that maximizes the probability that he receives some threshold level of this quality. We show that if the threshold is small relative to consumption levels, preferences will tend to be convex; whereas the opposite holds if the threshold is large. Our theory helps explain a broad spectrum of economic behavior (including, in particular, certain common commercial advertising strategies), suggesting that sensitivity to information about thresholds is deeply rooted in human psychology.
Introduction
Convexity of preferences is one of a small handful of canonical assumptions in economic theory. Typically justified in introductory texts by a brief appeal to introspection, convexity is appealing in part because it is conducive to marginal analysis and to single-valued, continuous demand functions.
1 But in the real world, there are many situations in which sudden shifts in demand are observed 2 , and the consumer's "preference for variety" finds its limits. It would therefore be useful to have a theory of preferences in which convexity (and its counterpart, nonconvexity) arises as the predictable result of a well-defined choice environment.
Given the ubiquity of convex preferences in economic models, it is surprising how little scrutiny this particular aspect of human nature has received.
3
While there have been many refinements to the theory of convex preferences (e.g., Kannai 1977, Richter and Wong 2004) , these authors always ultimately assume the primitive behavioral postulate in question, rather than asking the deeper question of the circumstances in which such preferences might be optimal.
4 Our approach to this question will be to explicitly step back from reliance on the consumer's subjective report of his motivations for choosing to purchase particular goods (a notoriously unreliable method of inquiry, if modern neuroscience is to be believed), 5 and appeal instead to evidence from 1 Such brevity is not limited to introductory textbooks. The popular graduate text of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, p. 44) justifies the convexity assumption as follows: "A taste for diversification is a realistic trait of economic life. Economic theory would be in serious difficulty if this postulated propensity for diversification did not have significant descriptive content."
2 An important example of such shifts in individual demand is the consumer response to product advertisements. This phenomenon is typically viewed in economics as driven by informative signaling (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986) rather than nonconvexities, but the two explanations are not necessarily inconsistent. Indeed, the framework we will develop emphasizes the role of information in inducing non-convex behavior, and-as we note below-even provides a rich framework for predicting ad content.
3 It should be noted that this lack of scrutiny does not pertain to the producer-theoretic analog of our question: the monopolist's optimal bundling decision. See, for example, Fang and Norman (2006) or Ibragimov (2005) .
4 A partial exception is found in the theory of risk-bearing, in which it has long been known that risk-averse consumers (i.e., consumers with concave expected utility functions) should choose a diversified portfolio (Arrow 1971 ). This result is closely related to the theory we will develop below, but again it requires assumption of the basic postulate (risk aversion).
5 See, for instance, Gazzaniga (2000) . For a broad review of findings in social psychology and neuroscience that relate to the development of economic and legal theory, see Hanson and Yosifon (2004) . fields such as social psychology, marketing, and behavioral ecology. The first innovation to flow from this dismissal of subjective experience will quickly become apparent: in developing the beginnings of a normative theory of convex preferences, we will treat as stochastic decision problems that have typically been viewed as deterministic. It is certainly true that a college student deciding what combination of bread and soup to consume at lunchtime is unlikely to view his decision as involving a risky portfolio of uncertain inputs (nutrients, pathogens, etc.) and unknown outcomes (health, survival), but viewed as a problem with an objective optimum-i.e., one in which the accumulated wisdom of human evolutionary history sees a multitude of possible outcomes, each with a well-defined payoff-that is exactly what it is.
The implications of our departure from the usual practice in consumer theory are not trivial. We investigate the circumstances under which evolution would have generated agents with (non-)convex preferences over goods. We follow the behavioral ecology literature in presuming that natural selection favors agents who maximize their expected payoff (where the payoff is "Darwinian fitness" or some proximate currency thereof) in a stochastic environment. The preferences-over goods-thus generated can therefore be considered optimal, given the underlying stochastic payoff structure. It will necessarily be true that the (ordinal) preferences generated by our model will depend importantly on the (cardinal) assumptions we make about the payoff structure. This raises the important question of whether our assumptions are testable, especially if the environment in which humans evolved differs substantially from conditions observed in the modern world.
6 While we do investigate a number of alternative assumptions about this postulated stochastic environment, we acknowledge from the outset that the task of empirical validation (of our primitive assumptions) is a task best left to the anthropological sciences. 6 This "evolutionary mismatch" problem arises in part because human culture, technology, and living conditions change more rapidly than innate "preferences" encoded in the human genome. Smith and Tasnádi (2007) model this mismatch explicitly-in distinguishing "beneficial" from "harmful" addictions-by positing that while in the former case an objective optimum is obtained, in the latter the consumer maximizes a "subjective function" based on demonstrably false beliefs about risky outcomes.
7 Interestingly, while we choose a stochastic framework for decision problems that are commonly perceived to be deterministic, Huffaker (1998) has argued the opposite: that most stochastic environments are driven by deterministic underlying physical phenomena, and thus can (and perhaps should) be modeled deterministically. We hope the reader will not see a contradiction in our agreement with this view. As noted, investigations of this sort necessarily cross disciplinary boundaries, and-at their best-draw on a much broader spectrum of disciplines than the traditional conception of "anthropology." Diamond (1997) provides a book-length example of such an endeavor; though less comprehensive This is not to say that our theory will not generate testable hypotheses. On the contrary, by viewing preferences as the endogenous outcome of a stochastic (evolutionary) payoff structure, we aim to develop a richer theory of consumer behavior in which "informative" cues induce systematic changes in behavior.
It is not difficult to imagine situations in the evolutionary history of our species in which a propensity for diversity in consumption would have been beneficial. An obvious example is nutrition: the human diet must include a host of essential nutrients (from calories and protein to iron and vitamin C) in order to sustain life, but no particular food contains all these nutrients in the necessary proportions. Similarly, in societies in which food sharing is an important form of social insurance, it might pay to distribute favors among many allies, rather than directing them to just a few close friends (Kaplan and Gurven 2005) . Or if loss of social status-an important form of "wealth" in many pre-industrial societies-is a concern, then it might make sense to avoid risky gambles involving large, conspicuous losses. The common theme we see in these examples is the presence of threshold payoffs: in the natural world, the consequences of consuming insufficient quantities of limiting micronutrients include debilitating illness and death 8 ; going an extended period of time without food results in starvation; and social status is by nature a relative measure, and-in the small groups that characterized most of human history-necessarily entails discrete thresholds with respect to rank order. We will argue in this paper that threshold payoffs provide a foundation upon which to build a theory of convex preferences that captures certain deeply rooted aspects of consumer psychology. Moreover (we argue) the implications of our theory are consistent with the content and form of many modern marketing messages delivered by profit-maximizing firms. This last observation underscores an important advantage of the theory of threshold utility we introduce, should it prove to have some generality: the same reasons that human evolution presumably favored strong reactions to the presence of thresholds (i.e., their stark consequences and ease of detection) make them promising subjects for empirical study in economics.
An important caveat warrants mention before we proceed to our formal investigations are certainly possible (see Rogers 1994 for a compelling example). For a discussion of the merits of pursuing ever-deeper levels of causation in the social sciences, see Smith (2009) . 8 Threshold requirements have long been the accepted norm in nutrition science, as reflected in Stigler's early work on diet as a linear programming problem (Stigler 1945) . The central importance of nutrition in the pre-industrial world is emphasized by Ortner and Theobald (2000) , who review archaeological evidence of deficiencies in vitamin C, vitamin D, iron, and protein in human prehistory.
model: although the convexity assumption is widely employed in economic analysis, it can be argued that it is not strictly testable with consumption data. This is because the behavioral implications of convexity and non-convexity are either not unique or cannot be strictly verified via revealed preference methodologies (Samuelson 1948 , Little 1949 , Houthakker 1950 . In particular, data that is apparently consistent with convex preferences cannot eliminate (with a finite number of observations) the possibility that local non-convexities still exist; and likewise data consistent with non-convex preferences cannot (because choice will never be observed in non-convex regions) rule out the possibility that the behavior is not the product of nearly linear (but still strictly convex) indifference curves. Nevertheless, the contrast-broadly speaking-between diversified consumption sensitive to marginal changes in budget parameters (i.e., convexity) and specialized consumption locally unresponsive to parameter values (i.e., nonconvexity) is striking, and we think further investigation of this aspect of consumer behavior is warranted.
Utility in the Presence of a Quality Threshold
Our starting point for this investigation is the problem studied by Smith and Tasnádi (2007) in the context of dietary habit formation. The setting was as follows: an individual chooses a bundle of two foods with uncertain concentrations of some limiting micronutrient. Given a finite gut size and known nutrient distributions, the objective was to choose the combination of foods that maximizes the probability that nutrient intake meets a critical threshold level-which, given the context, was assumed to be "small" relative to the amounts of food consumed. We extend this work below by studying the more general problem of optimal consumption in the presence of uncertain product quality, and by considering "large" as well as "small" thresholds in the objective function. Indeed, we will show that the size of the threshold is a critical determinant of the convexity (and nonconvexity) of preferences.
We now formalize the problem as follows. A decision-maker ("consumer") is faced with a menu of two goods, x and y, and must choose how much of each to consume, given income m and prices p and 1, respectively. There is a single unobservable characteristic (quality) for which there is a critical threshold: the consumer seeks only to maximize the probability that he consumes k units of this quality. The amounts of the unobservable quality per unit of x and y are independent random variables, denoted C x and C y , with distribution functions F and G, respectively. Formally, the consumer's utility function is given by
and his decision problem can be stated:
If the support of these random variables is the unit interval, 9 then (assuming continuous random variables with respective density functions f and g) 10 determination of the consumer's utility function
requires integration across five distinct regions in commodity space, which we illustrate in Figure 1 . If both random variables are non-negative and have finite support, this is just a matter of normalization. Because we are conceiving of C x and C y as representing the spectrum of outcomes observed over the course of human evolution, finite support seems to us a reasonable assumption.
10 Note that independence of f and g implies that the density of the sum of random variables C x x and C y y will be the convolution of their densities.
We will refer to these regions as follows: the "death zone"
+ | x + y ≤ k in which the probability of meeting the threshold is zero, the low-probability region A −− = (x, y) ∈ R 2 + | k < x + y, x ≤ k, y ≤ k in which probability of meeting the threshold is positive but the consumption levels of both goods are small (i.e., x, y ≤ k), the region
+ | x ≤ k, k < y in which the consumption level of x is small, the region
which the consumption level of y is small, and the region
which the consumption levels of both x and y are large relative to the size of the threshold.
An Informative Special Case: Uniform Distributions
In order to isolate the effects of the threshold on the consumer's behavior, we begin by assuming that the random variables C x and C y are distributed according to the uniform distribution on the unit interval, i.e.,
Case 1 "Uniform case":
The following proposition summarizes the properties of utility function (1).
Proposition 1 In Case 1, the consumer's utility function is quasi-concave on {(x, y) ∈ R 2 + | 2k ≤ x+y} and quasi-convex on {(x, y) ∈ R 2 + | k ≤ x+y ≤ 2k}. Moreover, the indifference curves that describe his preferences on R Proof. The utility function for Case 1 has been derived in a more general setting in Smith and Tasnádi (2007) .
11 Taking the symmetric setting into consideration we obtain for Case 1 that
The indifference curves of utility function U are shown in Figure 2 . It can be easily verified that the indifference curves for U are strictly concave in A −− , strictly convex in A ++ and linear in A −+ and A +− . Moreover, the indifference curves associated with positive threshold probabilities are continuously differentiable and reflection invariant about the line y = x by the symmetric setting. Now we turn to problem (2) in Case 1.
11 It should be noted that although Smith and Tasnádi (2007) establish analogous results, the accompanying discussion focuses exclusively on the region in which preferences are convex. In other words, it appears that these authors established an important non-convexity result without realizing its significance.
Proposition 2 The optimal solution of problem (2) in Case 1 is given by = k and p = 1.
Proof. We determine the optimal solution of Problem (2) as a function of k. Note that the consumer's utility function is strongly monotonic in R 2 + \ A 0 , and therefore, the optimal solution (x * , y * ) lies on the budget line, i.e., px
We start with the case p ≥ 1. Hence, we can assume that m > k, because otherwise the budget set is contained in A 0 and the consumer attains the threshold with probability zero. First, we assume that (x * , y * ) ∈ A ++ . Since the indifference curves in A ++ are strictly convex, the solution will be characterized by the indifference curve that has a unique intersection point with the budget line. Thus, we are searching for the utility level u for which
has a unique solution. From this we get
Because (x * , y * ) ∈ A ++ , we must have m/(2p) > k and m/2 > k, where the latter inequality is redundant because p ≥ 1. Second, it can be verified that if m/(2p) < k and p > 1, then we have a corner solution in A −+ . In particular, x * = 0 and y * = m. Third, if m/(2p) < k and p = 1, then the two corner solutions are x * = 0, y * = m and x * = m, y * = 0. Fourth, if m/(2p) = k and p > 1, then the continuum of optimal solutions is given by the line segment connecting points (0, m) and (k, m/2). Fifth, if m/(2p) = k and p = 1, then the continuum of optimal solutions is given by the line segment connecting points (0, m) and (m, 0).
Finally, taking the symmetric setting into consideration one can obtain the solutions for the case of p < 1 simply by exchanging the roles played by variables x and y in our calculations.
We illustrate the optimal solutions as a function of k in Figure 3 for p > 1. Note that there is a discontinuous change in the demand correspondence as the threshold k increases from values slightly lower than m/(2p) to values slightly higher than m/(2p). For fixed k, this implies in turn that demand will be discontinuous in (p, m). As a corollary to Proposition 2 we are able to formulate our first result on discontinuous threshold effects.
Corollary 1 In Case 1, we observe a discontinuous change in behavior at k = m/(2p) if p ≥ 1 and at k = pm/2 if p < 1.
In this section, we have established that in the case of uniformly distributed quality in the presence of a threshold payoff, preferences will be strictly convex if the threshold is "small enough" relative to the amount of x and y consumed (i.e., for bundles in region A ++ ), and strictly non-convex if the threshold is "large enough" (i.e., for bundles in region A −− ). And importantly, under these circumstances demand is a discontinuous function of both price and income. Before turning to a more general class of distributions, we provide an intuitive explanation for these results in the next section.
The Geometry of Threshold Effects
Our convexity results for Case 1 can be visualized in Figure 4 , which shows the effect of consumption on threshold utility in outcome space. Consider, for example, the line c x x ++ + c y y ++ = k (i.e., the line connecting the points (0, k y ++ ) and ( k x ++ , 0)). Given that the consumer chooses the consumption bundle (x ++ , y ++ ), this line traces the outcomes (c x , c y ) that result in the threshold level (k) of quality being exactly attained. Note that as drawn, x ++ = y ++ , and (x ++ , y ++ ) lies in region A ++ , because
Note also that because the random variables C x and C y are distributed uniformly (and independently) on the unit interval, probability mass for the joint distribution is (uniformly) distributed on the unit square in (c x , c y )-space. So given allocation (x ++ , y ++ ), the area in the unit square above and to the right of the line c x x ++ + c y y ++ = k is the probability of attaining k or more units of quality, and the area below and to the left of this line is the probability of attaining less than k units of quality. Now consider a slight shift in consumption, whereby the consumer gives up ε units of good x in exchange for pε units of good y. This results in a counter-clockwise rotation of the line c x x ++ + c y y ++ = k, so that the consumer "gains" area B ++ while losing area L ++ . It is easy to show that for p ≤ 1, area B ++ is smaller than area L ++ , so the consumer would have been better off with the "diversified" bundle in which x = y.
It should be apparent from Figure 4 that this logic is reversed in region A −− . In moving from allocation (x −− , y −− ) (where x −− = y −− ) to allocation (x −− − ε, y −− + pε) , the consumer increases the probability (given p ≥ 1) of exceeding the threshold. Hence for a sufficiently large threshold, preferences become non-convex.
Intuitively, when the threshold (k) is very small, the consumer chooses a strategy (diversification) that minimizes the "variance" of quality outcomes (i.e., C x x + C y y), because this will minimize the probability mass associated with the "very bad" outcomes that lie below the threshold. On the other hand, when the threshold is large enough, the consumer chooses a strategy (specialization) that increases the variance, in order to maximize the probability mass associated with the "very good" outcomes lying above the threshold. 
Generalization to Log-Concave Distributions

A General Statement
We now offer a generalization of the convexity properties and discontinuous threshold effect shown for Case 1 to random variables with log-concave density functions (i.e., random variables for which the logarithm of the density function is concave).
13 As might be expected, allowing for such a general class of random variables does not come without cost: several additional restrictions will be needed (the necessity of each will be shown in the next section), which underscore both the limitations of our framework and the importance of the product-specific probability distributions in determining threshold utility.
Definition 1 If C x and C y are two random variables, then we say that C x is more peaked than C y , whenever
for all t ≥ 0. If the above inequality is strict for all t > 0 unless the probabilities are either both 0 or both 1, then we say that C x is strictly more peaked than C y .
We will employ Proschan's (1965) Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 1 [Proschan 1965 ] Suppose that C x and C y are independent random variables both possessing a symmetric log-concave density function f. Then for any given m > 0 we have that Z λ,m := λC x + (m −λ)C y is strictly increasing in peakedness in λon 0,
It is also known that Z λ,m has a symmetric log-concave density function. We investigate the following objective function:
where λ∈ [0, m]. We are now ready to state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the independent nonnegative random variables C x and C y are symmetric around their common means µ = EC x = EC y , have log-concave density f and supp(C x ) =supp(C y ) = [0, 2µ]. Then we have the following four cases:
1. If k < mµ, then v is strictly quasi-concave with a maximum at m 2 (interior solution).
2. If mµ < k < 2mµ, then v is strictly quasi-convex with two maxima at 0 and m (boundary solutions).
3. If k = mµ, then v is constant.
If 2mµ ≤ k, then v equals zero (death zone).
Proof. Clearly, EZ λ,m = mµ, where λ∈ 0,
. Since f is symmetric around mµ, it follows for all t > 0 and all λ∈ 0,
Now pick two values αand βsuch that 0 ≤α<β≤ m/2. From Lemma 1 it follows that
for all mµ > t > 0. Combining (5) with (7), we obtain
and therefore by (6) we get
for all mµ > t > 0. Finally, in case 1 by setting t equal to mµ − k we derive
Thus v is strictly increasing on 0, m 2
. In an analogous way one can establish that v is strictly decreasing on m 2 , m . We derive the second statement from the first one. Assume that mµ < k < 2mµ. Then employing the symmetry of C x − µ and C y − µ, we obtain
where v * stands for the (restricted) utility function in case of constraint 2mµ− k > 0. Since for the problem associated with v * we have E(λC x +(m−λ)C y ) = mµ > k * = 2mµ − k by our assumption of case 2, v * is strictly quasi-concave with minima at 0 and m by case 1; and therefore, v is strictly quasi-convex with maxima at 0 and m.
Case 3 follows by the continuity of u. Finally, since C x and C y are nonatomic, nonnegative and symmetric with mean µ, the supports of C x and C y equal [0, 2µ],λC x + (m −λ)C y has to be smaller than 2mµ with probability one, which completes the proof of our proposition.
As a corollary of our previous proposition we obtain our main theorem. ), while from mµ to 2mµ the two optimal consumption bundles are (0, m) and (m, 0). In particular, if the payoff threshold k increases from mµ − ε to mµ + ε, where ε denotes a small positive value, then we observe a discontinuous shift in the consumer's behavior.
Counterexamples: Continuous Threshold Effects
One important restriction in Theorem 1 is that we consider only convex combinations of goods (i.e., we restrict our attention to budget lines with slope −1). 15 The following example shows that Theorem 1 cannot be generalized to arbitrary budget lines.
Case 2 Arbitrary Price counterexample:
By solving Problem 1 for Case 2 we obtain utility function U(x, y) =
If we maximize U above the budget line 0.8x + y = 50 and let the threshold vary from 24 to 25.5, we observe a continuous move from an interior solution to a corner solution. The optimal solutions as a function of k are depicted in Figure 5 . The next example shows that even for budget lines of slope −1, symmetry is a necessary assumption for establishing Theorem 1. Case 3 Non-symmetric counterexample:
Considering budget line y = 50−x, the optimal values for x as a function of k can be found in Figure 6 . We can observe a continuous move from the optimal interior solution x * = y * = 25 to the two corner solutions x * = 50, y * = 0 or x * = 0, y * = 50. Because of the symmetric setting we have two branches. Finally, we show that even log-concavity cannot be dropped without consequence in Theorem 1.
Case 4 Non-log-concave counterexample:
Considering again the budget line y = 50 − x, the optimal values for x as a function of k are shown in Figure 8 . Note the continuous change in the consumer's behavior for values around k = 10. By the symmetric setting, we again have two branches. Figure 9 emphasizes, for k = 10, that even the peakedness statement of Lemma 1 is violated in Case 4.
Cases 2, 3, and 4 establish that Theorem 1 does not hold in general if the assumptions p = 1, symmetry, and/or log-concavity are violated.
Non-Identical Distributions
Next we consider the case of non-identical distributions.
Definition 2 Random variable X dominates random variable Y in the sense of likelihood ratio, denoted by X ≻ Y , if f(x)/g(x) is non-decreasing in x, where f and g denote their respective density functions. We will employ Ma's (1998) Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 [Ma 1998 ] Suppose that X and Y are independent random variables possessing symmetric log-concave density functions f and g, respectively. If |X| ≻ |Y |, then for any given m > 0, (m −λ)X +λY is strictly increasing in peakedness in λon 0,
We investigate the following objective function:
where
Cx p +λC y . We are now ready to state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the independent nonnegative random variables C x and C y are symmetric around their means pµ = EC x and µ = EC y , have log-concave densities f and g and |C x /p − µ| ≻ |C y − µ|. If k < mµ, then the consumer, facing budget line px + y = m spends at least as much on good y as on good x.
Proof. Clearly, EZ λ,m = mµ, where λ∈ 0, m 2 . Since Z λ,m is symmetric around mµ, it follows for all t > 0 and all λ∈ 0, m 2 that P (mµ − t ≤ Z λ,m ≤ mµ) = P (mµ ≤ Z λ,m ≤ mµ + t) and (9)
Now pick two values αand βsuch that 0 ≤α<β≤ m/2. From Lemma 2 it follows that
for all mµ > t > 0. Combining (9) with (11), we obtain
and therefore by (10) we get
16 Note that assumption k < mµ implies t = mµ − k > 0.
Thus v is strictly increasing on 0, m 2 , which implies that the consumer buys at most m/(2p) units of good x and at least m/2 units of good y.
Proposition 4 implies that the consumer will not spend more on the "more risky" asset when the threshold is small. Note that under the assumptions of Proposition 4, the expected returns on a monetary unit of the two goods are identical; and that symmetry together with the likelihood dominance condition implies that the good with less "spread" should be preferred.
Economic Behavior and Threshold-Induced Nonconvexities
It seems likely to us that threshold payoffs played an important role in the evolutionary history of the human species, and that this history is reflected in our collective psychological architecture. If this hypothesis is correct, we would expect to see evidence of nonconvexity (i.e., corner solutions, or sudden shifts in demand) in situations for which a threshold is (or would have been, in human prehistory) within reach. An obvious first example is the one with which we began this investigation: consumption of a sufficient quantity of limiting micronutrients. As noted in Smith (2004) , food marketers appear to have stumbled on a deep truth about human nature: if you want to induce a dramatic upward shift in consumption of your product, broadcast messages proclaiming (at least implicitly) that this food has the power to cure illnesses of unknown origin. These messages, in which a "medical miracle" accompanies ingestion of the target product, are commonly employed in television advertisements for food aimed at children. In the pre-industrial world such scenarios would have provided critical information about nutritional value (Smith 2002) . In other words, providing information (in the form of situational cues embedded in advertising messages) to the consumer suggesting that a critical threshold is larger than might have otherwise been apparent, might effectively "shift demand" for the advertised product by inducing a local nonconvexity.
17
As noted by Rubin and Paul (1979) , reproductive success represents an obvious source of threshold payoffs in human history. The ubiquitous use of sexual themes in commercial advertisements could, therefore be viewed as providing "information" (in the subconscious, or psychological sense of the word) to the consumer about a looming threshold: buy this product, increase the probability of winning an attractive mate.
Thresholds are also likely to be important outside the world of commercial marketing messages: consider the important-and ubiquitous-life decision about family size. A woman (and her mate) can choose to have many childrenperhaps at the expense of per-child parental investment-or she can choose to have just one. Demographers have long known that fertility falls dramatically when economies transition from subsistence agriculture to an industrial economy (Jones et al. 1998) . A concise explanation for this phenomenon might be that in the developed world, the returns to education (i.e., parental investment) are much higher. In other words, the threshold for success in affluent societies is much higher, so parents respond by devoting more resources to fewer children.
There is also no reason our model could not be applied to choices made by producers. Diamond (2005) recounts the story of the medieval Greenland Norse, who demonstrated a surprising reluctance to utilize new and innovative technologies in the production of food. Having immigrated some years before to a stark and desolate land, they faced a perennial looming threshold: growing enough food in the short summer season to survive the long, cold winters. Perhaps the risks of diversification (given the consequences of failure) made it optimal, in some sense, to maintain the old ways. More generally, modern firms face the threat of bankruptcy-a fact of economic life that might push them toward extreme and high-risk (in other words, non-convex) business strategies.
As we noted at the outset, it is somewhat surprising that economics lacks a normative theory of convex preferences. It is our hope that in proposing one reason why preferences might be convex, we may have taken one small step toward being able to predict when preferences will be convex. And when they won't.
